Discussion:
Dec 15 voting amendment draft
(too old to reply)
Raul Miller
2002-12-15 19:46:47 UTC
Permalink
I'm going to [perhaps arbitrarily] claim that we have a "firm enough"
idea of what we're trying to achieve in our voting system. If you
disagree, please be explicit about the point(s) on which you disagree.

This is a revision of the Dec 7 draft.
http://lists.debian.org/debian-vote/2002/debian-vote-200212/msg00023.html

As always: if there are any ambiguities or other flaws with this proposal,
please let me know.

______________________________________________________________________

DRAFT:
______________________________________________________________________


Under 4.2 Procedure [for developers during a general resolution or
election], change item 3 to read:

3. Votes are taken by the Project Secretary. Votes and tallies results
are not revealed during the voting period; after the vote the
Project Secretary lists all the votes cast. The voting period is
2 weeks, but may be varied by up to 1 week by the Project Leader,
and may be ended by the Project Secretary when enough voters have
voted that even if every remaining voter voted in opposition to
the winner the outcome would remain the same. In this context, we
ignore the possibility that people might want to change their vote.

______________________________________________________________________

Under 5.2 Appointment of project leader, change item 7 to read:

7. The decision will be made using A.6 of the Standard Resolution
Procedure. The quorum is the same as for a General Resolution
(s.4.2) except the default option is None Of The Above.

______________________________________________________________________

Under 6.1 Powers [of the technical committee], change item 7 to read:

7. Appoint the Chairman of the Technical Committee. The Chairman
is elected by the Committee from its members. All members of the
committee are automatically nominated; the committee vote starting
one week before the post will become vacant (or immediately, if it
is already too late). The members may vote by public acclamation
for any fellow committee member, including themselves; there is
no default option. The vote finishes when all the members have
voted or when the outcome is no longer in doubt. The result is
determined using A.6 of the Standard Resolution Procedure.

______________________________________________________________________

Under A.2 Calling for a vote, change item 2 to read

2. The proposer or a sponsor of a motion may call for a vote on a
set of related amendments.

______________________________________________________________________

Replace A.3 with:

A.3. Voting procedure

1. Each independent set of related amendments is voted on in a
separate ballot. Each such ballot has as options all the sensible
combinations of amendments and options from that set, and a default
option. If the default option wins then the entire resolution
procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.
2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement
have a 1:1 majority requirement.
3. The vote taker (if there is one) or the voters (if voting is done
by public pronouncement) may arrange for independent ballots
to be held simultaneously, even (for example) using a single
voting message.
4. Votes may be cast during the voting period, as specified elsewhere.
If the voting period can end if the outcome is no longer in
doubt, the possibility that voters may change their votes is
not considered.
5. The votes are counted according to the the rules in A.6 If a
quorum is required then the default option is Further Discussion.
6. In cases of doubt the Project Secretary shall decide on matters
of procedure (for example, whether particular amendments should
be considered independent or not).

______________________________________________________________________

Replace A.5 with:

A.5. Expiry

If a proposed resolution has not been discussed, amended, voted on or
otherwise dealt with for 4 weeks the secretary may issue a statement
that the issue is being withdrawn. If none of the sponsors of any
of the proposals object within a week, the issue is withdrawn.

The secretary may also include suggestions on how to proceed,
if appropriate.

______________________________________________________________________

Replace A.6 with:

A.6 Vote Counting

1. Each voter's ballot ranks the options being voted on. Not all
options need be ranked. Ranked options are considered preferred
to all unranked options. Voters may rank options equally.
Unranked options are considered to be ranked equally with one
another, and below any explicitly ranked options. The other
details of how ballots may be filled out will be included in
the Call For Votes.
2. If the ballot has a quorum requirement (Q) any options other
than the default option which do not receive at least Q votes
ranking that option above the default option are dropped from
consideration.
3. Any option which does not defeat the default option by its
required majority ratio is dropped from consideration.
a. An option A defeats an option B if N(A,B)*V(A,B) is larger
than N(B,A)*V(B,A) and if the (A,B) defeat has not been
dropped.
b. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters
who prefer option A over option B.
c. If a majority of n:1 is required for A, and B is the default
option, N(B,A) is n. In all other cases, N(B,A) is 1.
4. We construct the Schwartz set based on undropped options and
defeats:
a. An option A is in the Schwartz set if for all options B,
either A transitively defeats B, or B does not transitively
defeat A.
b. An option A transitively defeats an option C if A defeats
C or if there is some other option B where A defeats B
AND B transitively defeats C.
5. If there are defeats between options in the Schwartz set, we
drop the weakest such defeats, and return to step 4.
a. A defeat (A,X) is weaker than a defeat (B,Y) if V(A,X)
is less than V(B,Y). Also, (A,X) is weaker than (B,Y)
if V(A,X) is equal to V(B,Y) and V(X,A) is greater than
V(Y,B).
b. A weakest defeat is a defeat that has no other defeat
weaker than it. There may be more than one such defeat.
6. If there are no defeats within the Schwartz set, then the winner
is chosen from the options in the Schwartz set. If there is
only one such option, it is the winner. If there are multiple
options, the elector with a casting vote chooses which of those
options wins. If there are no options in the Schwartz set,
the default option wins.

"RATIONALE": Options which the voters rank above the default option
are options they find acceptable. Options ranked below the default
options are options they find unacceptable.

______________________________________________________________________

Thanks,

--
Raul
Matthias Urlichs
2002-12-15 20:38:20 UTC
Permalink
Hi,
Post by Raul Miller
I'm going to [perhaps arbitrarily] claim that we have a "firm enough"
idea of what we're trying to achieve in our voting system.
I agree.
IMRHO this is OK as-is.
(The R stands for 'reasonably'. ;-)
Post by Raul Miller
Thanks,
??? _I_ thank _you_ for the work you did on this.

[ Note, below, the randomly selected quote from my quote file ]
[ Available on play.smurf.noris.de, port 17 ]
--
Matthias Urlichs | noris network AG | http://smurf.noris.de/
--
Slous' Contention:
If you do a job too well, you'll get stuck with it.
Anthony DeRobertis
2002-12-16 06:01:48 UTC
Permalink
Post by Raul Miller
7. The decision will be made using A.6 of the Standard Resolution
Insert "section" between "using" and "A.6"
Post by Raul Miller
Procedure. The quorum is the same as for a General Resolution
(s.4.2) except the default option is None Of The Above.
I assume the "s" is supposed to be ISO-8859-1 character code 167, the
section symbol, "§"?
Post by Raul Miller
7. Appoint the Chairman of the Technical Committee. The Chairman
is elected by the Committee from its members. All members of the
committee are automatically nominated; the committee vote starting
Change "vote" after "committee" to "votes". Alternatively, if "committee
vote" is the name or description of the event, then change "starting" to
"starts".

The third, and my favorite, alternative is "the committee starts voting"
Post by Raul Miller
one week before the post will become vacant (or immediately, if it
is already too late). The members may vote by public acclamation
for any fellow committee member, including themselves; there is
Either the "all members of the committee are automatically nominated" or
the "for any fellow committee member, including themselves" is
redundant.
Post by Raul Miller
no default option. The vote finishes when all the members have
voted or when the outcome is no longer in doubt. The result is
Here you use the short form "no longer in doubt". However, above (not
quoted, in 4.2.3) you did a long-run around this phrase. I suggest just
using the phrase, and finding somewhere to define it.
Post by Raul Miller
A.3. Voting procedure
1. Each independent set of related amendments is voted on in a
separate ballot. Each such ballot has as options all the sensible
combinations of amendments and options from that set, and a default
Strike "such" in "Each such ballot." Further, there is something wrong
there --- I think the second use of options ("amendments and options")
should be struck.
Post by Raul Miller
option. If the default option wins then the entire resolution
procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.
4. Votes may be cast during the voting period, as specified elsewhere.
If the voting period can end if the outcome is no longer in
doubt, the possibility that voters may change their votes is
not considered.
Strike "if" in "if the voting...."

Change "in doubt, the" to "in doubt, ignoring the" and strike "is not
considered" from the end. Alternatively, if you like the phrase "not
considered," then use "not considering" instead of "ignoring"
Post by Raul Miller
A.5. Expiry
If a proposed resolution has not been discussed, amended, voted on or
otherwise dealt with for 4 weeks the secretary may issue a statement
change "4" to "four"
Post by Raul Miller
that the issue is being withdrawn. If none of the sponsors of any
of the proposals object within a week, the issue is withdrawn.
Change "any of the proposals" to "the proposal". We are talking about a
single "proposed resolution". If this was intended to allow sponsors of
amendments to object, then that needs to be clarified (e.g., "of the
proposal or any amendments of it")
Post by Raul Miller
The secretary may also include suggestions on how to proceed,
if appropriate.
I don't think that sentence is needed.
Post by Raul Miller
A.6 Vote Counting
1. Each voter's ballot ranks the options being voted on. Not all
options need be ranked. Ranked options are considered preferred
to all unranked options. Voters may rank options equally.
Unranked options are considered to be ranked equally with one
another, and below any explicitly ranked options. The other
details of how ballots may be filled out will be included in
the Call For Votes.
Change "may" to "must" in "may be filled." The act of voting itself is
optional, however, the format of the ballot is not.

Also, "filled in" seems to be slightly preferred over "filled out",
according to Google.
Post by Raul Miller
2. If the ballot has a quorum requirement (Q) any options other
than the default option which do not receive at least Q votes
ranking that option above the default option are dropped from
consideration.
Q is not the number of votes needed for the quorum! Sometimes, quorum is
2. Other times it is thrice Q --- that is, 3Q.

Q is just a number defined in 4.2.7 as half the square root of the
number of developers.
Post by Raul Miller
3. Any option which does not defeat the default option by its
required majority ratio is dropped from consideration.
a. An option A defeats an option B if N(A,B)*V(A,B) is larger
than N(B,A)*V(B,A) and if the (A,B) defeat has not been
dropped.
I was about to tell you to define A, B, N, V, and (A,B) but I see you've
done it below. Please make this (c) --- put the definitions above their
use.
Post by Raul Miller
b. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters
who prefer option A over option B.
c. If a majority of n:1 is required for A, and B is the default
option, N(B,A) is n. In all other cases, N(B,A) is 1.
Erm, we use N(A,B) above, but define N(B,A) here.
Post by Raul Miller
4. We construct the Schwartz set based on undropped options and
a. An option A is in the Schwartz set if for all options B,
either A transitively defeats B, or B does not transitively
defeat A.
b. An option A transitively defeats an option C if A defeats
C or if there is some other option B where A defeats B
AND B transitively defeats C.
Once again, change (a) and (b).
Post by Raul Miller
5. If there are defeats between options in the Schwartz set, we
drop the weakest such defeats, and return to step 4.
a. A defeat (A,X) is weaker than a defeat (B,Y) if V(A,X)
is less than V(B,Y). Also, (A,X) is weaker than (B,Y)
if V(A,X) is equal to V(B,Y) and V(X,A) is greater than
V(Y,B).
b. A weakest defeat is a defeat that has no other defeat
weaker than it. There may be more than one such defeat.
Well, you can guess what I'm going to say here.
Post by Raul Miller
6. If there are no defeats within the Schwartz set, then the winner
is chosen from the options in the Schwartz set. If there is
only one such option, it is the winner. If there are multiple
options, the elector with a casting vote chooses which of those
options wins. If there are no options in the Schwartz set,
the default option wins.
Is it possible for the default option to be a member of the Schwartz
set? If so, should it win in that case?
Raul Miller
2002-12-16 06:50:27 UTC
Permalink
Anthony Towns
2002-12-16 07:13:43 UTC
Permalink
Post by Anthony DeRobertis
Post by Raul Miller
6. If there are no defeats within the Schwartz set, then the winner
is chosen from the options in the Schwartz set. If there is
only one such option, it is the winner. If there are multiple
options, the elector with a casting vote chooses which of those
options wins. If there are no options in the Schwartz set,
the default option wins.
Is it possible for the default option to be a member of the Schwartz
set? If so, should it win in that case?
No, it's not possible -- the default option should always be eliminated
at A.6.3. The Schwartz set is composed of options which defeat the
default option. If no options defeat the default option the default
option wins.
The default option never defeats itself.
*gack* Why don't you just say "The default option is dropped", rather than
talking around the issue instead? The straightforward way of dealing with
this is:

* Drop options that don't make quorum
* Drop options that don't make supermajority
* If the default option is the only option remaining, it wins.
* Drop the default option.
* Work out the winner from the remaining options using CpSSD

Alternatively:

* Drop options that don't make quorum
* Drop options that don't have the appropriate majority over the
default option
* Work out the winner from the remaining options (including
default) using CpSSD -- default will win if and only if it's
the only option remaining; since all other remaining options
defeat the default option

(which is how I interpreted your original post)
In principle, this should be obvious from the definition of defeat,
but a little redundancy sometimes helps alleviate confusion.
A.6.2 and A.6.3 are about eliminating due to quorum and supermajority,
neither of which apply to the default option. Trying to apply them to
the default option is what's confusing. (eg, presumably there aren't
Q votes that rank the default option above the default option, so it
should already have been dropped before A.6.3 comes into play...)

Cheers,
aj
--
Anthony Towns <***@humbug.org.au> <http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/>
I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred.

``Australian Linux Lovefest Heads West''
-- linux.conf.au, Perth W.A., 22nd-25th January 2003
Anthony Towns
2002-12-16 07:24:45 UTC
Permalink
Post by Anthony DeRobertis
I was about to tell you to define A, B, N, V, and (A,B) but I see you've
done it below. Please make this (c) --- put the definitions above their
use.
Please explain why this is better?
Because people read through these things from top to bottom, and get a
little shock each time they see a word that doesn't make any sense from
the context they have, or at least, I do. It's irritating and distracting.
If I adopt "define before use", does
this mean I'm supposed to place the definitions above the sentences which
use those definitions? Does the constitution need to be completely
reorderd so that voting mechanics are defined before we discuss the
contexts where voting is used?
There are two ways of doing things: either provide a general overview
first, then a detailed explanation later; or to define the details
first, then put them together later. The first is generally better,
since it makes it easier to skim the document for the important details,
but it only if you can give a meaningful overview without defining
the details. Saying ``To decide the matter, the membership vote'' is
fine, since you don't have to understand exactly how the vote is taken
(email? show of hands? Condorcet? plurality?) to get the gist of what's
going on. Saying ``Weakest defeats are eliminated'' isn't okay, since
you've got no idea what that means until "weakest defeats" is explained
to you.
Post by Anthony DeRobertis
Post by Raul Miller
c. If a majority of n:1 is required for A, and B is the default
option, N(B,A) is n. In all other cases, N(B,A) is 1.
(D is the default option; give people context cues so they don't have
to remember as much)

Cheers,
aj
--
Anthony Towns <***@humbug.org.au> <http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/>
I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred.

``Australian Linux Lovefest Heads West''
-- linux.conf.au, Perth W.A., 22nd-25th January 2003
Anthony DeRobertis
2002-12-17 17:27:19 UTC
Permalink
Post by Anthony DeRobertis
Post by Raul Miller
7. The decision will be made using A.6 of the Standard Resolution
Insert "section" between "using" and "A.6"
Hmm... is it a section or an appendix? Should it matter? Currently,
Either is fine.
What does this add?
Nothing; it just makes it sound a little better.
Currently, the constitution is ascii, and doesn't use "§" at all.
Ah. Understood.
I'm tempted to leave the "amendments and options" bit the way it is,
but I need to think about this a bit more to figure out why or why not
or what else instead.
Problem is that you're using options in the sentence twice with a
different meaning each time. Maybe if you changed the second occurrence
of "options" to "choices" it'd be clearer. [The first one could be
changed instead, but that'd require a bunch of other changes.]
Post by Anthony DeRobertis
Post by Raul Miller
The secretary may also include suggestions on how to proceed,
if appropriate.
I don't think that sentence is needed.
Are you saying this is a bad hint?
No, it's a good hint. It just seems out of place in the constitution.
Post by Anthony DeRobertis
Also, "filled in" seems to be slightly preferred over "filled out",
according to Google.
Interesting.
But does this matter?
Nope. It's just interesting. The meaning is clear either way.

Anthony Towns covered the suggestions on moving the definitions around
No, it's not possible -- the default option should always be eliminated
at A.6.3.
Ah... I guess I'll defer to Anthony Towns in
<***@azure.humbug.org.au> this time. I got lost
somewhere in that appendix; it reads like a math textbook...
Raul Miller
2002-12-17 17:46:31 UTC
Permalink
On Tue, Dec 17, 2002 at 12:27:19PM -0500, Anthony DeRobertis wrote:
[a follow up message]

Thanks for the help -- I'll try to incorporate this into another draft
either tomorrow or thursday. I'm going to be unavailable (in Albuquerque,
NM) for the week around Christmas, but I think it'll be good to get
another draft out before then.

Thanks again,
--
Raul
Anthony DeRobertis
2002-12-17 18:05:47 UTC
Permalink
Post by Raul Miller
I'm going to be unavailable (in Albuquerque,
NM) for the week around Christmas,
Then, let me take the time now to wish you happy holidays!
Thomas Smith
2002-12-16 22:30:18 UTC
Permalink
Hi,
Post by Raul Miller
Under 4.2 Procedure [for developers during a general resolution or
3. Votes are taken by the Project Secretary. Votes and tallies results
are not revealed during the voting period; after the vote the
Project Secretary lists all the votes cast.
Maybe we should say that the Secretary lists the votes in a way that
does not reveal both a voter's name and vote to anyone other than the
voter.
Post by Raul Miller
Under A.2 Calling for a vote, change item 2 to read
2. The proposer or a sponsor of a motion may call for a vote on a
set of related amendments.
This is a problem because the previous item states that the
proposer/sponsor may call for a vote but it is never stated what that
person can call for a vote on. Also, this draft of item 2 does not let
the proposer of a motion call for a vote on that motion.
Post by Raul Miller
A.3. Voting procedure
1. Each independent set of related amendments is voted on in a
separate ballot. Each such ballot has as options all the sensible
combinations of amendments and options from that set, and a default
option. If the default option wins then the entire resolution
procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.
This wording says nothing about motions. Should it? Perhaps earlier
mentions of "amendments" should be changed to "motions to amend" and
this section should be changed to talk about motions.
Post by Raul Miller
3. Any option which does not defeat the default option by its
required majority ratio is dropped from consideration.
a. An option A defeats an option B if N(A,B)*V(A,B) is larger
than N(B,A)*V(B,A) and if the (A,B) defeat has not been
dropped.
I have a comprehensible name for N(A,B)*V(A,B): "scaled number of votes
preferring A to B". So the subitem could begin "An option A defeats an
option B if the scaled number of votes preferring A to B N(A,B)*V(A,B)
is larger..."

The name could be stripped down somewhat and remain readable...

This would be a compromise between leaving the reader bewildered by not
defining details vs. defining details first so that the reader doesn't
get the big picture. I disagree with Anthony DeRobertis that you should
define the details first, since "weakest defeat" does not sound too
obscure to me. N(B,A)*V(B,A), OTOH, does.

Thanks,
--thomas
--
Thomas "resc" Smith <***@finbar.dyndns.org>
web: http://finbar.dyndns.org/
gpg key id 1024D/ACABA81E, fingerprint:
3A47 CFA5 0E5D CF4A 5B22 12D3 FF1B 84FE ACAB A81E
Raul Miller
2002-12-17 17:41:59 UTC
Permalink
Post by Thomas Smith
Post by Raul Miller
Under 4.2 Procedure [for developers during a general resolution or
3. Votes are taken by the Project Secretary. Votes and tallies results
are not revealed during the voting period; after the vote the
Project Secretary lists all the votes cast.
Maybe we should say that the Secretary lists the votes in a way that
does not reveal both a voter's name and vote to anyone other than the
voter.
That doesn't apply to general resolutions, and I think that's
adequately covered elsewhere.
Post by Thomas Smith
Post by Raul Miller
Under A.2 Calling for a vote, change item 2 to read
2. The proposer or a sponsor of a motion may call for a vote on a
set of related amendments.
This is a problem because the previous item states that the
proposer/sponsor may call for a vote but it is never stated what that
person can call for a vote on. Also, this draft of item 2 does not let
the proposer of a motion call for a vote on that motion.
Hmm... I'll need to rethink this. Not today, though, I've been up
all night and I'd probably overlook too many things.
Post by Thomas Smith
Post by Raul Miller
A.3. Voting procedure
1. Each independent set of related amendments is voted on in a
separate ballot. Each such ballot has as options all the sensible
combinations of amendments and options from that set, and a default
option. If the default option wins then the entire resolution
procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.
This wording says nothing about motions. Should it? Perhaps earlier
mentions of "amendments" should be changed to "motions to amend" and
this section should be changed to talk about motions.
Probably -- I (or maybe someone else) needs to go through the constitution
and look at all the words used to describe ballot options and make sure
that the end result is coherent.
Post by Thomas Smith
Post by Raul Miller
3. Any option which does not defeat the default option by its
required majority ratio is dropped from consideration.
a. An option A defeats an option B if N(A,B)*V(A,B) is larger
than N(B,A)*V(B,A) and if the (A,B) defeat has not been
dropped.
I have a comprehensible name for N(A,B)*V(A,B): "scaled number of votes
preferring A to B". So the subitem could begin "An option A defeats an
option B if the scaled number of votes preferring A to B N(A,B)*V(A,B)
is larger..."
I think I can use that, thanks.
--
Raul
Manoj Srivastava
2003-02-04 20:12:31 UTC
Permalink
Hi folks,

Are we satisfied with the latest draft? Should we move this from a
draft to a proposed GR, and try and get this voted upon in February?
Raul? AJ?

manoj


______________________________________________________________________

DRAFT:
______________________________________________________________________


Under 4.2 Procedure [for developers during a general resolution or
election], change item 3 to read:

3. Votes are taken by the Project Secretary. Votes and tallies results
are not revealed during the voting period; after the vote the
Project Secretary lists all the votes cast. The voting period is
2 weeks, but may be varied by up to 1 week by the Project Leader,
and may be ended by the Project Secretary when enough voters have
voted that even if every remaining voter voted in opposition to
the winner the outcome would remain the same. In this context, we
ignore the possibility that people might want to change their vote.

______________________________________________________________________

Under 5.2 Appointment of project leader, change item 7 to read:

7. The decision will be made using A.6 of the Standard Resolution
Procedure. The quorum is the same as for a General Resolution
(s.4.2) except the default option is None Of The Above.

______________________________________________________________________

Under 6.1 Powers [of the technical committee], change item 7 to read:

7. Appoint the Chairman of the Technical Committee. The Chairman
is elected by the Committee from its members. All members of the
committee are automatically nominated; the committee vote starting
one week before the post will become vacant (or immediately, if it
is already too late). The members may vote by public acclamation
for any fellow committee member, including themselves; there is
no default option. The vote finishes when all the members have
voted or when the outcome is no longer in doubt. The result is
determined using A.6 of the Standard Resolution Procedure.

______________________________________________________________________

Under A.2 Calling for a vote, change item 2 to read

2. The proposer or a sponsor of a motion may call for a vote on a
set of related amendments.

______________________________________________________________________

Replace A.3 with:

A.3. Voting procedure

1. Each independent set of related amendments is voted on in a
separate ballot. Each such ballot has as options all the sensible
combinations of amendments and options from that set, and a default
option. If the default option wins then the entire resolution
procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.
2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement
have a 1:1 majority requirement.
3. The vote taker (if there is one) or the voters (if voting is done
by public pronouncement) may arrange for independent ballots
to be held simultaneously, even (for example) using a single
voting message.
4. Votes may be cast during the voting period, as specified elsewhere.
If the voting period can end if the outcome is no longer in
doubt, the possibility that voters may change their votes is
not considered.
5. The votes are counted according to the the rules in A.6 If a
quorum is required then the default option is Further Discussion.
6. In cases of doubt the Project Secretary shall decide on matters
of procedure (for example, whether particular amendments should
be considered independent or not).

______________________________________________________________________

Replace A.5 with:

A.5. Expiry

If a proposed resolution has not been discussed, amended, voted on or
otherwise dealt with for 4 weeks the secretary may issue a statement
that the issue is being withdrawn. If none of the sponsors of any
of the proposals object within a week, the issue is withdrawn.

The secretary may also include suggestions on how to proceed,
if appropriate.

______________________________________________________________________

Replace A.6 with:

A.6 Vote Counting

1. Each voter's ballot ranks the options being voted on. Not all
options need be ranked. Ranked options are considered preferred
to all unranked options. Voters may rank options equally.
Unranked options are considered to be ranked equally with one
another, and below any explicitly ranked options. The other
details of how ballots may be filled out will be included in
the Call For Votes.
2. If the ballot has a quorum requirement (Q) any options other
than the default option which do not receive at least Q votes
ranking that option above the default option are dropped from
consideration.
3. Any option which does not defeat the default option by its
required majority ratio is dropped from consideration.
a. An option A defeats an option B if N(A,B)*V(A,B) is larger
than N(B,A)*V(B,A) and if the (A,B) defeat has not been
dropped.
b. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters
who prefer option A over option B.
c. If a majority of n:1 is required for A, and B is the default
option, N(B,A) is n. In all other cases, N(B,A) is 1.
4. We construct the Schwartz set based on undropped options and
defeats:
a. An option A is in the Schwartz set if for all options B,
either A transitively defeats B, or B does not transitively
defeat A.
b. An option A transitively defeats an option C if A defeats
C or if there is some other option B where A defeats B
AND B transitively defeats C.
5. If there are defeats between options in the Schwartz set, we
drop the weakest such defeats, and return to step 4.
a. A defeat (A,X) is weaker than a defeat (B,Y) if V(A,X)
is less than V(B,Y). Also, (A,X) is weaker than (B,Y)
if V(A,X) is equal to V(B,Y) and V(X,A) is greater than
V(Y,B).
b. A weakest defeat is a defeat that has no other defeat
weaker than it. There may be more than one such defeat.
6. If there are no defeats within the Schwartz set, then the winner
is chosen from the options in the Schwartz set. If there is
only one such option, it is the winner. If there are multiple
options, the elector with a casting vote chooses which of those
options wins. If there are no options in the Schwartz set,
the default option wins.

"RATIONALE": Options which the voters rank above the default option
are options they find acceptable. Options ranked below the default
options are options they find unacceptable.

______________________________________________________________________
--
We decided it was night again, so we camped for twenty minutes and
drank another six beers at a Young Life campsite. O.C. got into the
supervisory adult's sleeping bag and ran around in it. "This is the
judgment day and I'm a terrifying apparition," he screamed. Then the
heat made O.C. ralph in the bag. The Utterly Monstrous, Mind-Roasting
Summer of O.C. and Stiggs, National Lampoon, October 1982
Manoj Srivastava <***@debian.org> <http://www.debian.org/%7Esrivasta/>
1024R/C7261095 print CB D9 F4 12 68 07 E4 05 CC 2D 27 12 1D F5 E8 6E
1024D/BF24424C print 4966 F272 D093 B493 410B 924B 21BA DABB BF24 424C
Anthony Towns
2003-02-05 08:19:40 UTC
Permalink
Post by Raul Miller
Under 4.2 Procedure [for developers during a general resolution or
3. Votes are taken by the Project Secretary. Votes and tallies results
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

"Votes and results are not revealed..." ? It's not clear what "tallies"
means.
Post by Raul Miller
7. The decision will be made using A.6 of the Standard Resolution
Procedure.
"using the method specified in section A.6"
Post by Raul Miller
The quorum is the same as for a General Resolution
(s.4.2) except the default option is None Of The Above.
^^^^^^

"and"
Post by Raul Miller
7. [...] The result is
determined using A.6 of the Standard Resolution Procedure.
As above.
Post by Raul Miller
______________________________________________________________________
Under A.2 Calling for a vote, change item 2 to read
2. The proposer or a sponsor of a motion may call for a vote on a
set of related amendments.
"The proposer or any sponsor of a resolution may call for a vote on that
resolution and all related amendments."
Post by Raul Miller
______________________________________________________________________
A.3. Voting procedure
1. Each independent set of related amendments is voted on in a
separate ballot. Each such ballot has as options all the sensible
combinations of amendments and options from that set, and a default
option. If the default option wins then the entire resolution
procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.
I think it's a mistake to keep that; exactly how to separate independent
but related options is a job for the proposers of the resolution and its
amendment, not the secretary.

"Each resolution and its related amendments is voted on in a single
ballot, that includes an option for the original resolution, each
amendment, and, where applicable, the default option."
Post by Raul Miller
3. The vote taker (if there is one) or the voters (if voting is done
by public pronouncement) may arrange for independent ballots
to be held simultaneously, even (for example) using a single
voting message.
So this could die.
Post by Raul Miller
4. Votes may be cast during the voting period, as specified elsewhere.
If the voting period can end if the outcome is no longer in
doubt, the possibility that voters may change their votes is
not considered.
(This duplicates the text you've already had above)
Post by Raul Miller
5. The votes are counted according to the the rules in A.6 If a
quorum is required then the default option is Further Discussion.
"...otherwise there is no default option."
Post by Raul Miller
6. In cases of doubt the Project Secretary shall decide on matters
of procedure (for example, whether particular amendments should
be considered independent or not).
This could die too.
Post by Raul Miller
______________________________________________________________________
A.6 Vote Counting
1. Each voter's ballot ranks the options being voted on. Not all
options need be ranked. Ranked options are considered preferred
to all unranked options. Voters may rank options equally.
Unranked options are considered to be ranked equally with one
another, and below any explicitly ranked options. The other
details of how ballots may be filled out will be included in
the Call For Votes.
One of "and below any explicitly ranked options" and "Ranked options
are considered preferred to all unranked uptions" can be dropped.

I'd drop "The other" -- all the details of how ballots should be filled
out should be included in the CFV.
Post by Raul Miller
2. If the ballot has a quorum requirement (Q) any options other
than the default option which do not receive at least Q votes
ranking that option above the default option are dropped from
consideration.
3. Any option which does not defeat the default option by its
required majority ratio is dropped from consideration.
a. An option A defeats an option B if N(A,B)*V(A,B) is larger
than N(B,A)*V(B,A) and if the (A,B) defeat has not been
dropped.
b. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters
who prefer option A over option B.
c. If a majority of n:1 is required for A, and B is the default
option, N(B,A) is n. In all other cases, N(B,A) is 1.
A simpler way of saying the same thing:

3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default option
by its required majority ratio is dropped from consideration.

a. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters
who prefer option A over option B.
b. An option, A, defeats the default option, D, by a ratio, N,
if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A).
c. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, it's majority ratio
is S, otherwise it's majority ratio is 1.

(note that the default option is thus defeated by all the remaining
undropped options; and will thus lose if there are any such options)
Post by Raul Miller
4. We construct the Schwartz set based on undropped options and
a. An option A is in the Schwartz set if for all options B,
either A transitively defeats B, or B does not transitively
defeat A.
b. An option A transitively defeats an option C if A defeats
C or if there is some other option B where A defeats B
AND B transitively defeats C.
c. An option A defeats an option B, if V(A,B) is strictly
greater than V(B,A).

(Which is the usual, and uncomplicated, definition of the term)
Post by Raul Miller
5. If there are defeats between options in the Schwartz set, we
drop the weakest such defeats, and return to step 4.
a. A defeat (A,X) is weaker than a defeat (B,Y) if V(A,X)
is less than V(B,Y). Also, (A,X) is weaker than (B,Y)
if V(A,X) is equal to V(B,Y) and V(X,A) is greater than
V(Y,B).
b. A weakest defeat is a defeat that has no other defeat
weaker than it. There may be more than one such defeat.
6. If there are no defeats within the Schwartz set, then the winner
is chosen from the options in the Schwartz set. If there is
only one such option, it is the winner. If there are multiple
options, the elector with a casting vote chooses which of those
options wins. If there are no options in the Schwartz set,
the default option wins.
Keeping the default option around, lets us kill the last sentence's
special case, too.
Post by Raul Miller
"RATIONALE": Options which the voters rank above the default option
are options they find acceptable. Options ranked below the default
options are options they find unacceptable.
s/"RATIONAL"/Interpretation/ or something.

I don't think any of the above are hugely significant quibbles.

Cheers,
aj
--
Anthony Towns <***@humbug.org.au> <http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/>
I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred.

``Dear Anthony Towns: [...] Congratulations --
you are now certified as a Red Hat Certified Engineer!''
Manoj Srivastava
2003-02-05 19:25:46 UTC
Permalink
Post by Anthony Towns
Post by Raul Miller
Under 4.2 Procedure [for developers during a general resolution or
3. Votes are taken by the Project Secretary. Votes and tallies results
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
"Votes and results are not revealed..." ? It's not clear what "tallies"
means.
I have modified it to "Votes, tallies, and results are not
revealed ..".

Tallies, originally, a piece of wood on which notches
or scores were cut. Results would mean Bdale Garbee won the 2002
election; tallies would mean Branden Robinson Got X votes, Bdale
Garbee got Y votes.
Post by Anthony Towns
Post by Raul Miller
______________________________________________________________________
A.3. Voting procedure
1. Each independent set of related amendments is voted on in a
separate ballot. Each such ballot has as options all the sensible
combinations of amendments and options from that set, and a default
option. If the default option wins then the entire resolution
procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.
I think it's a mistake to keep that; exactly how to separate independent
but related options is a job for the proposers of the resolution and its
amendment, not the secretary.
I guess I must be dense. All that the item is saying that one
does not tack on unrelated amendments to a GR a la US congress. I do
not see any language as to who is making this decision; apart from
the statement that the secretary creates the ballot. In this case,
the proposers could come together and ask for the secretary to create
a ballot given selected options.

Even if I agree in principle to the fact that deciding what is
unrelated belongs to the proposers, what if the proposers of the
resolution, and proposers of amendments that are not acceptable to
the original proposers disagree?
Post by Anthony Towns
"Each resolution and its related amendments is voted on in a single
ballot, that includes an option for the original resolution, each
amendment, and, where applicable, the default option."
Hmm. Are we saying there are cases where no default action may
be on the ballot? Wouldn't a "make no changes pursuant to this GR"
always be a reasonable default option?
Post by Anthony Towns
Post by Raul Miller
3. The vote taker (if there is one) or the voters (if voting is done
by public pronouncement) may arrange for independent ballots
to be held simultaneously, even (for example) using a single
voting message.
So this could die.
I guess this is indeed superfluous.
Post by Anthony Towns
Post by Raul Miller
5. The votes are counted according to the the rules in A.6 If a
quorum is required then the default option is Further Discussion.
"...otherwise there is no default option."
Is there ever a case that a GR has absolutely no quorum
requirement? Did we not decide that there should always be an option
that people may chose above all others to express a displeasure with
the ballot itself?
Post by Anthony Towns
Post by Raul Miller
6. In cases of doubt the Project Secretary shall decide on matters
of procedure (for example, whether particular amendments should
be considered independent or not).
This could die too.
I would abide by that if that is the consensus. (I disagree,
but I can't take a strong stand on this, seeing that I am the
secretary. I do think we need to provide for a conflict resolution
process/person).
Post by Anthony Towns
Post by Raul Miller
6. If there are no defeats within the Schwartz set, then the winner
is chosen from the options in the Schwartz set. If there is
only one such option, it is the winner. If there are multiple
options, the elector with a casting vote chooses which of those
options wins. If there are no options in the Schwartz set,
the default option wins.
Keeping the default option around, lets us kill the last sentence's
special case, too.
I am not sure I understand. Are we saying that the default
option shall always be in the Schwartz set?


Here is the latest version, with most of the changes aj
suggested, apart from the ones I did not understand.

manoj
Anthony Towns
2003-02-06 04:48:40 UTC
Permalink
Post by Manoj Srivastava
Post by Anthony Towns
Post by Raul Miller
A.3. Voting procedure
1. Each independent set of related amendments is voted on in a
separate ballot. Each such ballot has as options all the sensible
combinations of amendments and options from that set, and a default
option. If the default option wins then the entire resolution
procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.
I think it's a mistake to keep that; exactly how to separate independent
but related options is a job for the proposers of the resolution and its
amendment, not the secretary.
I guess I must be dense. All that the item is saying that one
does not tack on unrelated amendments to a GR a la US congress.
There's two things: one is keeping amendments related to the original
part (which I'm not sure that what we've currently got really does that),
and the other is manufacturing options to vote on, by extending, say:

Original Resolution
Original Resolution, amended according to A
Original Resolution, amended according to B
Original Resolution, amended according to C

...to also include:

Original Resolution, amended according to A and B (*)
Original Resolution, amended according to A and C (*)

(as a "sensible combination of amendments"). Working out that "B and C"
can't be "sensibly" applied together should probably be a job for the
people who'd vote for "O + B and C", not the secretary.
Post by Manoj Srivastava
I do
not see any language as to who is making this decision; apart from
the statement that the secretary creates the ballot. In this case,
the proposers could come together and ask for the secretary to create
a ballot given selected options.
Sure, they can do that anyway, by proposing another amendment. If they're
not required to do that, the secretary's the only one left who can.
Post by Manoj Srivastava
Even if I agree in principle to the fact that deciding what is
unrelated belongs to the proposers, what if the proposers of the
resolution, and proposers of amendments that are not acceptable to
the original proposers disagree?
Anyone can propose an amendment, whether the original proposers disagree
or not.

But really, that's the question: if there are different "sensible" ways
of putting `B and C' together, it's easier and saner to just let people
gather seconds in the usual way to get their preferred phrasing on the
ballot, than to argue about it with you, or worse, argue about it when
there's no clear authority to make decision.
Post by Manoj Srivastava
Post by Anthony Towns
"Each resolution and its related amendments is voted on in a single
ballot, that includes an option for the original resolution, each
amendment, and, where applicable, the default option."
Hmm. Are we saying there are cases where no default action may
be on the ballot? Wouldn't a "make no changes pursuant to this GR"
always be a reasonable default option?
I'm not sure; there are certainly some votes where there's no default
option, it's not clear to me which ones are held using the whole of
appendix A, and which are only held using A.6. 4.2(4) requires an
immediate vote with no quorum, and I'm not sure if a default option
makes an incredible amount of sense.
Post by Manoj Srivastava
Post by Anthony Towns
Post by Raul Miller
5. The votes are counted according to the the rules in A.6 If a
quorum is required then the default option is Further Discussion.
"...otherwise there is no default option."
Is there ever a case that a GR has absolutely no quorum
requirement?
See 4.2(4). Also, A.6 assumes there's a default option; if there's not
always (and there isn't -- the tech ctte leadership elections don't have
one) then the rules that discuss the default option should probably be
preceeded by an "If there is a default option...".

If there's always to be a default option when all of A is used, that
should be written: "Unless otherwise specified, the default option is
Further Discussion" -- quorum is irrelevant.
Post by Manoj Srivastava
Post by Anthony Towns
Post by Raul Miller
6. In cases of doubt the Project Secretary shall decide on matters
of procedure (for example, whether particular amendments should
be considered independent or not).
This could die too.
I would abide by that if that is the consensus.
Whether particular amendments should be considered separate or not
isn't strictly procedural IMO; it'd at least be good to kill the bit
in brackets, which afaict is the only bit of procedure that's not spelt
out. I have no problem with the rest of it.
Post by Manoj Srivastava
Post by Anthony Towns
Post by Raul Miller
6. If there are no defeats within the Schwartz set, then the winner
is chosen from the options in the Schwartz set. If there is
only one such option, it is the winner. If there are multiple
options, the elector with a casting vote chooses which of those
options wins. If there are no options in the Schwartz set,
the default option wins.
Keeping the default option around, lets us kill the last sentence's
special case, too.
I am not sure I understand. Are we saying that the default
option shall always be in the Schwartz set?
No: as long as we go into the Cloneproof-SSD set with a non-empty set of
options, then we'll end up with a non-empty Schwartz set. If we keep the
default option, and all the options that defeat the default option (or
all the options on the ballot, if there's no default option), then that'll
be non-empty, and we'll have one or more options in the Schwartz set.

ie, the steps I'm suggesting are:

1. If there's a default option, satisfy quorum and supermajority
[this leaves us with the default option, and those other
options that satisify q & sm; or else it leaves all the
options]

2. Apply cloneproof-SSD
[this does nothing but eliminate defeats / break ties, so
while it reduces the size of the Schwartz set, never
empties it; if we've got a default option, it's either
the only option, or its not in the Schwartz set ever]

3. Choose a winner from the Schwartz set

Does that make sense yet?

Cheers,
aj
--
Anthony Towns <***@humbug.org.au> <http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/>
I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred.

``Dear Anthony Towns: [...] Congratulations --
you are now certified as a Red Hat Certified Engineer!''
Jochen Voss
2003-02-06 07:43:06 UTC
Permalink
Hello,
Post by Anthony Towns
1. If there's a default option, satisfy quorum and supermajority
[this leaves us with the default option, and those other
options that satisify q & sm; or else it leaves all the
options]
2. Apply cloneproof-SSD
[this does nothing but eliminate defeats / break ties, so
while it reduces the size of the Schwartz set, never
empties it; if we've got a default option, it's either
the only option, or its not in the Schwartz set ever]
3. Choose a winner from the Schwartz set
Does that make sense yet?
For me it makes sense. It limits our modifications to implement
quorum and supermajority to one well defined step, and in the absence
of q & sm it is trivial to verify that we really do cloneproof-SSD.
I would like this solution.

Jochen
--
Omm
(0)-(0)
http://www.mathematik.uni-kl.de/~wwwstoch/voss/index.html
Manoj Srivastava
2003-02-06 16:18:23 UTC
Permalink
Post by Anthony Towns
Post by Manoj Srivastava
I guess I must be dense. All that the item is saying that one
does not tack on unrelated amendments to a GR a la US congress.
There's two things: one is keeping amendments related to the original
part (which I'm not sure that what we've currently got really does that),
Original Resolution
Original Resolution, amended according to A
Original Resolution, amended according to B
Original Resolution, amended according to C
Original Resolution, amended according to A and B (*)
Original Resolution, amended according to A and C (*)
(as a "sensible combination of amendments"). Working out that "B and C"
can't be "sensibly" applied together should probably be a job for the
people who'd vote for "O + B and C", not the secretary.
Ooh. The full impact of your wording just struck me. So,
rather than the secretary taking the amendments, and then tacking on
``sensible combinations'' on the ballot, we let people propose
amendments that are combinations of previous amendments, and the
secretary merely lists _all_ proposed amendments, including those
that are combinations of other amendments, on the ballot.

OK, I'm with you on this.
Post by Anthony Towns
I'm not sure; there are certainly some votes where there's no default
option, it's not clear to me which ones are held using the whole of
appendix A, and which are only held using A.6. 4.2(4) requires an
immediate vote with no quorum, and I'm not sure if a default option
makes an incredible amount of sense.
See 4.2(4). Also, A.6 assumes there's a default option; if there's
not always (and there isn't -- the tech ctte leadership elections
don't have one) then the rules that discuss the default option
should probably be preceeded by an "If there is a default
option...".
That answers my question -- yes, 4.2(4) and 6.1(7) specify
cases in which there is a vote with no default option.
Post by Anthony Towns
If there's always to be a default option when all of A is used, that
should be written: "Unless otherwise specified, the default option is
Further Discussion" -- quorum is irrelevant.
I think I am leaning towards this. I could not grok why there
should be a connection between quorum and a default option -- this
makes things simpler, and makes more sense, to me.

It also allows one to express a dissatisfaction with the
potential results in a vote with no explicit quorum requirements --
(arguably, A.3(2) says there is a supermajority of 1:1 be default).
Post by Anthony Towns
Whether particular amendments should be considered separate or not
isn't strictly procedural IMO; it'd at least be good to kill the bit
in brackets, which afaict is the only bit of procedure that's not spelt
out. I have no problem with the rest of it.
done.
Post by Anthony Towns
1. If there's a default option, satisfy quorum and supermajority
[this leaves us with the default option, and those other
options that satisify q & sm; or else it leaves all
the options
2. Apply cloneproof-SSD
[this does nothing but eliminate defeats / break ties, so
while it reduces the size of the Schwartz set, never
empties it; if we've got a default option, it's either
the only option, or its not in the Schwartz set ever]
3. Choose a winner from the Schwartz set
Does that make sense yet?
Does to me.

Here is the latest version of the draft, with, hopefully, all
the changes in. Unless there are objections, perhaps we should
formally propose and second this draft, and set a discussion time of
a week or so, to let people on -devel weigh in on this if they wish
(since we have been discussing this _for ever_, I think the short
discussion period is justified).

manoj
Jochen Voss
2003-02-06 17:57:29 UTC
Permalink
Hello Manoj,

the new draft looks good to me. I only found some stylistic issues.
Post by Raul Miller
Under 4.2 Procedure [for developers during a general resolution or
3. ..., and may be ended by the Project Secretary when
enough voters have voted that even if every remaining voter
voted in opposition to the winner the outcome would remain the
same.
The term "vote in opposition to the winner" looks suboptimal to me.
Consider the case of many candidates. Maybe we could write something
along the lines of "... when the missing votes cannot change the result
anymore"?
Post by Raul Miller
A.3. Voting procedure
[...]
3. The votes are counted according to the the rules in A.6.
Unless otherwise specified, the default option is Further
Discussion.
I suggest quotes around "Further Discussion".
Post by Raul Miller
A.5. Expiry
... If none of the sponsors of any
of the proposals object within a week, the issue is withdrawn.
^^^^^^^
objects (?)
Post by Raul Miller
A.6 Vote Counting
[...]
2. If the ballot has a quorum requirement (Q) any options other
^^^
see below
Post by Raul Miller
than the default option which do not receive at least Q votes
ranking that option above the default option are dropped from
consideration.
3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default option
by its required majority ratio is dropped from consideration.
a. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters
who prefer option A over option B.
b. An option, A, defeats the default option, D, by a ratio, N,
^^^ ^^^^^^^
see below majority ratio
Post by Raul Miller
if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A).
c. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, it's majority ratio
is S, otherwise it's majority ratio is 1.
4. We construct the Schwartz set based on undropped options and
a. An option A defeats an option B, if V(A,B) is strictl
^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
see below strictly
Post by Raul Miller
greater than V(B,A).
About the three places marked above: I think we should increase
stylistic consistency by just writing "quorum requirement Q",
and "option A" in place of the three variants above.

I hope this helps,
Jochen
--
Omm
(0)-(0)
http://www.mathematik.uni-kl.de/~wwwstoch/voss/index.html
Andrew Suffield
2003-02-12 14:05:42 UTC
Permalink
[I'm considering only issues of intelligability/readability here. I
stipulate that, given basic understanding of math and logic, the
constitution should be self-contained.]
Post by Raul Miller
Under 4.2 Procedure [for developers during a general resolution or
3. Votes are taken by the Project Secretary. Votes, tallies, and
results are not revealed during the voting period; after the
vote the Project Secretary lists all the votes cast. The voting
period is 2 weeks, but may be varied by up to 1 week by the
Project Leader, and may be ended by the Project Secretary when
enough voters have voted that even if every remaining voter
voted in opposition to the winner the outcome would remain the
same. In this context, we ignore the possibility that people
might want to change their vote.
This reads poorly. Why not simply use the current phrasing "when the
outcome is no longer in doubt"?
Post by Raul Miller
Under A.2 Calling for a vote, change item 2 to read
2. The proposer or any sponsor of a resolution may call for a vote on that
resolution and all related amendments.
I think that item 4. needs to be similarly reworded, eliminating the
clause "or the last related formal amendment was accepted if an
amendment is being voted on".
Post by Raul Miller
A.3. Voting procedure
1. Each resolution and its related amendments is voted on in a
single ballot, that includes an option for the original
resolution, each amendment, and, where applicable, the default
option.
There aren't necessarily any amendments, so I'd write it without the
weak implication that "each amendment" is always applicable.

1. Each resolution and its related amendments is voted on in a
single ballot, that includes an option for the original
resolution, each amendment, and the default option (where
applicable).
Post by Raul Miller
2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement
have a 1:1 majority requirement.
A footnote/citation here which explains "supermajority" would seem
sensible. (I know these don't form a formal part of the constitution,
but people still need to understand the draft/proposal).

"For example, a 2:1 supermajority means that the number of people
voting in favour of this proposal must be at least twice the number
who vote against it."

Can anybody improve on that description?
Post by Raul Miller
A.6 Vote Counting
6. If there are no defeats within the Schwartz set, then the winner
is chosen from the options in the Schwartz set. If there is
only one such option, it is the winner. If there are multiple
options, the elector with a casting vote chooses which of those
options wins.
It is possible to have an election where there is no casting vote. For
example, electing the chairman of the Technical Committee when the
current chairman is AWOL, or likewise with the DPL. What happens then?


I also express support for Jochen Voss's suggestions on the
modifications to appendix A.
--
.''`. ** Debian GNU/Linux ** | Andrew Suffield
: :' : http://www.debian.org/ | Dept. of Computing,
`. `' | Imperial College,
`- -><- | London, UK
Anthony Towns
2003-02-12 14:52:26 UTC
Permalink
Post by Andrew Suffield
It is possible to have an election where there is no casting vote. For
example, electing the chairman of the Technical Committee when the
current chairman is AWOL, or likewise with the DPL. What happens then?
The TC chair and secretary can act as DPL if the DPL's absent. I'm not
worried about this sort of corner case; if you are, and you'd like to
propose something, you're welcome to of course.

Cheers,
aj
--
Anthony Towns <***@humbug.org.au> <http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/>
I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred.

``Dear Anthony Towns: [...] Congratulations --
you are now certified as a Red Hat Certified Engineer!''
Andrew Suffield
2003-02-13 20:28:55 UTC
Permalink
Post by Anthony Towns
Post by Andrew Suffield
It is possible to have an election where there is no casting vote. For
example, electing the chairman of the Technical Committee when the
current chairman is AWOL, or likewise with the DPL. What happens then?
The TC chair and secretary can act as DPL if the DPL's absent. I'm not
worried about this sort of corner case; if you are, and you'd like to
propose something, you're welcome to of course.
Ah, I forgot about that clause. Seems adequetely covered, then.
--
.''`. ** Debian GNU/Linux ** | Andrew Suffield
: :' : http://www.debian.org/ | Dept. of Computing,
`. `' | Imperial College,
`- -><- | London, UK
Clinton Mead
2003-02-12 15:07:22 UTC
Permalink
Regarding the Feburary 7th draft.

Are the results this draft produces equivalent to the results produced
using this method?

(a) All voters tick an 'approved' box next to all options that would of
been above the default option using the draft method.
(b) Any option which recieves a majority (or supermajority ) of approved
ticks is 'approved'.
(c) Any option which is not approved is eliminated.
(d) If all options are eliminated, the default option wins, otherwise
CSSD is performed on non-eliminated non-default options.

And if so, does the draft method have the same strategy problems as
approval?

I suggest that it does, as it would not be difficult to construct a
ballot where only one option is 'approved' ('approved' meaning not
eliminated in step 3 of vote counting). These ballots are effectively
approval ballots, as CSSD is not used or needed by the draft method, and
hence have the same properties as approval ballots.

Clinton Mead.
Manoj Srivastava
2003-02-13 16:42:19 UTC
Permalink
Regarding the Feburary 7th draft. Are the results this draft
produces equivalent to the results produced using this method?
(a) All voters tick an 'approved' box next to all options that
would
of been above the default option using the draft method.
(b) Any option which recieves a majority (or supermajority ) of
approved ticks is 'approved'.
(c) Any option which is not approved is eliminated.
(d) If all options are eliminated, the default option wins,
otherwise
CSSD is performed on non-eliminated non-default options.
And if so, does the draft method have the same strategy problems as
approval?
Hmm. Looking at http://www.electionmethods.org/approved.htm,
I don't see what strategy problems you are referring to: the
strategies in place seem mostly to be selecting the winner, which we
do not do here, and not about elimination. The only reason for
elimination is if there are not enough people who rate that option
above the default; if some option has enough voters, there is little
I can do to change that, and eliminate that option.
I suggest that it does, as it would not be difficult to construct a
ballot where only one option is 'approved' ('approved' meaning not
eliminated in step 3 of vote counting). These ballots are
effectively approval ballots, as CSSD is not used or needed by the
draft method, and hence have the same properties as approval
ballots.
Can you elaborate on how tis works? How can one construct a
ballot for a vote about colors of the rainbow, say, where the
candidates are
Violet, Indigo,Blue, Green, Yellow, Orange, and Red, and Violet and
Red have a supermajority requirement of 2:1?

manoj
--
To a Californian, a person must prove himself criminally insane before
he is allowed to drive a taxi in New York. For New York cabbies,
honesty and stopping at red lights are both optional. From "East
vs. West: The War Between the Coasts
Manoj Srivastava <***@debian.org> <http://www.debian.org/%7Esrivasta/>
1024R/C7261095 print CB D9 F4 12 68 07 E4 05 CC 2D 27 12 1D F5 E8 6E
1024D/BF24424C print 4966 F272 D093 B493 410B 924B 21BA DABB BF24 424C
Clinton Mead
2003-02-14 06:33:37 UTC
Permalink
I believe most efficient way to get an effective election method it to
build up a set of essential criteria, and select a method that matches
those criteria. I found the criteria mentioned on electionmethods.org
too vague for me to understand, due to the use of the words 'sincerly'
and 'not falsifying'. So I've attempted to translate the criteria below.

---

Monotonicity Criteria.

If
(i) There is an election X in which option A wins,
(ii) There is a vote V that ranks option B above option A.
(iii) There is an election Y which is identical to election X except
that vote V has option A and option B swaped on their preference list.
then
Option A must win election Y.

Smith Criteria.

If
(i) There is a non-empty set of options S.
(ii) Every option in S superdefeats every option not in S.
(iii) The election is not effected by quorum defaults.
then
The winner must be a option in the set S.

Also, another criteria.

Participation Monotonicity.

If
(i) There is an election X in which option A wins.
(ii) There is a vote V ranks option A over option B.
(iii) There is an election Y identical to election X except that it has
an additional vote V.
then
Option B must not win election Y.

What Participation Monotonicity says is, that participation will never
cause a less prefered option to win than non-participation. That is, it
is never advantagous to not participate.

---

Argument that feb 7th draft method is not acceptable.

Axiom: For an election system to be acceptable, it must follow
Participation Monotonicity.

Therefore, for feburary 7th draft to be acceptable, it must follow
Participation Monotonicity.

(i) Let election X =

2 ABD
1 BDA

(D is default, A has 1:1 supermajority, B has 1:1 supermajority)

Option A wins election X.

(ii) Let vote V = DAB

Vote V ranks option A above option B.

(iii) Let election Y =

2 ABD
1 BDA
1 DAB

(D is default, A has 1:1 supermajority, B has 1:1 supermajority)

Which is identical to election X except vote V is added.

Then for feb 7th draft to follow Participation Monotonicity, option B
must not win election Y.
However, option B does win election Y.

Therefore, feb 7th draft does not follow Participation Monotoncity.

Therefore, feb 7th draft is not acceptable.

--

One thing I have assumed is true above is that Participation Monotoncity
is essential. In my opinion the concensus on this mailing list is that
the election method should not encourage and reward anyone for not
voting, and hence Participation Monotoncity is essential. If anyone
disagrees with that, or my argument is flawed at some point, please say.

--

Clinton Mead
Raul Miller
2003-02-14 16:06:13 UTC
Permalink
[First off, I should apologize: I've let this whole issue slide for the
last month. I'm having a terrible time getting decent connectivity,
but it's my fault for letting that get in the way.]
Post by Clinton Mead
Monotonicity Criteria.
If
(i) There is an election X in which option A wins,
(ii) There is a vote V that ranks option B above option A.
(iii) There is an election Y which is identical to election X except
that vote V has option A and option B swaped on their preference list.
then
Option A must win election Y.
I have a few quibbles about quantifiers (for this to be correct,
(ii) should begin "For any vote V" and (iii) should begin "For
all elections Y"), but essentially this is correct.
Post by Clinton Mead
Smith Criteria.
That definition was also too relaxed -- mind you, in this relaxed form
the proposal complies with this criteria where if it was expressed in
exact form the proposal wouldn't. But I guess it doesn't really matter,
since that's not what Clinton is writing about.
Post by Clinton Mead
Also, another criteria.
Participation Monotonicity.
If
(i) There is an election X in which option A wins.
(ii) There is a vote V ranks option A over option B.
(iii) There is an election Y identical to election X except that it has
an additional vote V.
then
Option B must not win election Y.
I did a web search on "participation monotonicity", the only hit I found
was http://www.wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de/~imw/papers/332/convexfuzzygames.pdf

Where did you find this criteria? [Did you make it up?]

One way of modifying the current proposal to satisfy this criteria
would be to make quorum and supermajority failures be transitive. But,
if you recall, my last attempt at that violated monotonicity (a much
worse failing, in my opinion). Also, Anthony Towns has made a fairly
convincing case that supermajority failures should not be transitive.

In my opinion, "participation monotonicity" is something we should
minimize, but I'm not convinced we should entirely eliminate it -- I
don't think it's more valuable than monotonicity, quorum, supermajority,
nor than preference ranking of options (nor than condorcent voting
for elections where all votes satisfy quorum and supermajority), and I
think we'd have to effectively give up some or all of these to guarantee
"participation monotonicity".

That said, if you can show that the Feb 7 proposal does not minimize
failure along this dimension within the above constraints, or if you
can show that there's a better set of constraints, I think we'd all be
interested in hearing about that.

Thanks,
--
Raul
Manoj Srivastava
2003-02-14 21:14:57 UTC
Permalink
Hi,
Post by Raul Miller
[First off, I should apologize: I've let this whole issue slide for
the last month. I'm having a terrible time getting decent
connectivity, but it's my fault for letting that get in the way.]
Glad to see you are back. Want to take over the stewardship of
this GR again? I only stepped in since I think we ought to move to
the next phase, and treat this as a formal draft, and start the
discussion period (when we can hammer out any last minute details);
and I don't want to steal your (and aj's, and others) thunder, since
y'all did all the heavy lifting.

manoj
--
The society which scorns excellence in plumbing because plumbing is a
humble activity and tolerates shoddiness in philosophy because
philosophy is an exalted activity will have neither good plumbing nor
good philosophy. Neither its pipes nor its theories will hold water.
-- John W. Gardner
Manoj Srivastava <***@debian.org> <http://www.debian.org/%7Esrivasta/>
1024R/C7261095 print CB D9 F4 12 68 07 E4 05 CC 2D 27 12 1D F5 E8 6E
1024D/BF24424C print 4966 F272 D093 B493 410B 924B 21BA DABB BF24 424C
m***@links.magenta.com
2003-02-15 18:27:43 UTC
Permalink
Post by Manoj Srivastava
Glad to see you are back. Want to take over the stewardship of
this GR again?
I'll be happy to contribute, as I can, but I don't want to get in the
way, and I can't guarantee that I'll be able to put as much time into
this as it deserves.

That said, we look to be pretty close to wrapping this up, from my point
of view.
--
Raul
Clinton Mead
2003-02-15 03:55:34 UTC
Permalink
Post by Raul Miller
Post by Clinton Mead
Monotonicity Criteria.
If
(i) There is an election X in which option A wins,
(ii) There is a vote V that ranks option B above option A.
(iii) There is an election Y which is identical to election X except
that vote V has option A and option B swaped on their preference list.
then
Option A must win election Y.
I have a few quibbles about quantifiers (for this to be correct,
(ii) should begin "For any vote V" and (iii) should begin "For
all elections Y"), but essentially this is correct.
I'm not sure why "For any vote V" is required.

I'll illistrate with a simple example, additive identity.

Additive Identity Criteria.

If
(i) There is an element A.
then
A + 0 = A

So if there exists 5, then 5 + 0 = 5

I could also say.

For any A,
A + 0 = A

However applying your suggestion of replacing "There is" with "For any"
to this example.

If
(i) For any element A.
then
A + 0 = A

Doesn't seem to make gramatical sence to me. As you point out, the
meaning is the same, I just find my definition easier to use in proofs.
Post by Raul Miller
Post by Clinton Mead
Smith Criteria.
That definition was also too relaxed -- mind you, in this relaxed form
the proposal complies with this criteria where if it was expressed in
exact form the proposal wouldn't. But I guess it doesn't really matter,
since that's not what Clinton is writing about.
I'm not sure how relaxed you believe it is.

It is relaxed, as you point out, with regards to supermajorities, but it
isn't relaxed with regards to non-supermajority elections.

Lets take this election.

2 AB

Smith criteria says the winner shall come from the set {A, B}.
Smith criteria also says the winner shall come from the set {A}.

If it fails once, it fails totally, so the only way for smith criteria
to be satisfied is for A to be the winner.

The criteria implies the innermost unbeaten set, without having to
explictly state it, which simplifies proofs, IMHO.

You may have relised this, however your previous response about your
interuptation gave me the contrary view, so I thought I should clarify it.
Post by Raul Miller
Post by Clinton Mead
Also, another criteria.
Participation Monotonicity.
If
(i) There is an election X in which option A wins.
(ii) There is a vote V ranks option A over option B.
(iii) There is an election Y identical to election X except that it has
an additional vote V.
then
Option B must not win election Y.
I did a web search on "participation monotonicity", the only hit I found
was http://www.wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de/~imw/papers/332/convexfuzzygames.pdf
Where did you find this criteria? [Did you make it up?]
I have seen it before, and I have noticed it has been talked about on
this boards with particularly in regard to quorums (that is, it should
not be advantagous for people not to vote). Admitedly, I didn't check
how it was refered to, so I just made a name up on the spot and gave it
a definition I felt was reasonable.
Post by Raul Miller
One way of modifying the current proposal to satisfy this criteria
would be to make quorum and supermajority failures be transitive. But,
if you recall, my last attempt at that violated monotonicity (a much
worse failing, in my opinion). Also, Anthony Towns has made a fairly
convincing case that supermajority failures should not be transitive.
I agree generally with this paragraph. I think what is causing the
problems is the implimentations of the default option, in particular how
it is treated very speically. I am still of the opinion that in this
election.

100 ABD
99 BAD

Where A has a 50:1 supermajority requirement, and D is default, B should
win, as opposed to A. (Election 1)

I don't think options with large supermajorities should easily win just
because no-one wants to "further discuss" any more.

Also, in this election.

4 ABD
3 BDA
2 DAB

Where D is default.

I believe D should win, that is any cycles should favour the default
option. (Election 2)

These opinions somewhat influences how I design my election methods.
Post by Raul Miller
In my opinion, "participation monotonicity" is something we should
minimize, but I'm not convinced we should entirely eliminate it -- I
don't think it's more valuable than monotonicity, quorum, supermajority,
nor than preference ranking of options (nor than condorcent voting
for elections where all votes satisfy quorum and supermajority), and I
think we'd have to effectively give up some or all of these to guarantee
"participation monotonicity".
That said, if you can show that the Feb 7 proposal does not minimize
failure along this dimension within the above constraints, or if you
can show that there's a better set of constraints, I think we'd all be
interested in hearing about that.
Thanks,
I agree that monotonicity is more important, but I still think
participation monotonicity is still very important, as encouraging
people to not vote is never a good thing. Really, we should be looking
for a method if possible that satisfies both, along with quorums and
supermajorities. I'm not convinced thats impossible yet.

I'm going to present two methods. I would appresiate if anyone can point
out if these fail the above three criteria, or if anything else is wrong
with them.

For simplicies sake, let an (X:Y) supermajority be X/Y below (that is
(3:2) = 1.5).

To give the default option preference as in Election 2, let the
supermajority requirement of the default option < 1.

Firstly, the method I prefer, which gives my prefered result in Election 1.

---

(1) A defeats B if more votes prefer A over B than prefer B over A.

(2) A defeats B by (X,Y), if A defeats B, where X is equal to the number
of votes that prefer A over B, and Y is the number of votes that prefer
B over A,

(3a) Defeat (X1,Y1) is greater than Defeat (X2,Y2) if X1 is greater than X2.
(3b) Defeat (X1,Y1) is less than Defeat (X2,Y2) if X1 is less than X2.
(3c) Defeat (X1,Y1) is greater than Defeat (X2,Y2) if X1 is equal to X2
and Y1 is less than Y2.
(3d) Defeat (X1,Y1) is less than Defeat (X2,Y2) if X1 is equal to X2 and
Y1 is greater than Y2.
(3e) Defeat (X1,Y1) is equal to Defeat (X2,Y2) if X1 is equal to X2 and
Y1 is equal to Y2.

(4a) A superdefeats B, if A has a greater supermajority requirement than
B, and number of votes that prefer A over B multiplied by X is greater
than the number of votes that prefer B over A, where A has a
supermajority requirement of X,

(4b) A superdefeats B, if A has an equal supermajority requirement as B,
and A defeats B.

(4c) A superdefeats B, if A has a smaller supermajority requirement than
B and B does not superdefeat A.

(5a) S is an undefeated set, if every option in set S superdefeats every
option not in set S, and S is non-empty.

(5b) S is the smith set, if there is no subset of S not equal to S which
is an undefeated set.

(5c) A is considered, if A is in the smith set, and there is no B such
that B is in the smith set and B has a smaller supermajority requirement
than A.

(6a) A has a beatpath to B of strength X, if A defeats B by X,

(6b) A has a beatpath to B of strength X, if A defeats C by Y and C has
a beatpath to B of strength Z, where X is equal to the minimum of Y and Z.

(6c) A has a beatpath to B of strength 0, if there is no X such that A
has a beatpath to B of strength X

(7) A has a beatpath win to B if the largest X such that A has a
beatpath to B of X is greater than the largest Y such that B has a
beatpath to A of Y.

(8) A is a finalist if A is considered and B is considered, and there is
no B such that B has a beatpath win to A.

(9) A is a winner if A is a finalist and there is no B such that B is a
finalist and the casting vote prefers B over A.

---

Now, a method I don't like as much, which leans towards the current
implimentation, replace rule 4 as below.

(4a) A superdefeats B, if A is not the default option, and B is not the
default option, and A defeats B.

(4b) A superdefeats B, if A is not the default option, and B is the
default option, and number of votes that prefer A over B multiplied by X
is greater than the number of votes that prefer B over A, where A has a
supermajority requirement of X,

(4c) A superdefeats B, if A is the default option, and B is not the
default option, and B does not superdefeat A.

---

Thanks.

Clinton
Branden Robinson
2003-02-14 16:49:35 UTC
Permalink
A pet peeve of mine:

The singular of "criteria" is "criterion".

The plural of "criterion" is "criteria".

If you're feeling generous, please try to remember this in future
discussions.
--
G. Branden Robinson | "I came, I saw, she conquered."
Debian GNU/Linux | The original Latin seems to have
***@debian.org | been garbled.
http://people.debian.org/~branden/ | -- Robert Heinlein
Steve Greenland
2003-02-13 14:44:35 UTC
Permalink
Post by Raul Miller
A.6 Vote Counting
2. If the ballot has a quorum requirement (Q) any options other
than the default option which do not receive at least Q votes
ranking that option above the default option are dropped from
consideration.
It was pointed out in an earlier draft thread that Q and quorum are
not the same - Q is a number defined earlier (4.2.7), while the quorum
depends on the type of vote, and is frequently a multiple of Q. While
A.6.2 could be read as *defining* Q to be the quorum requirement,
it could also be read as defining the quorum requirement to be the
previously defined value of Q.

Steve
--
Steve Greenland
The irony is that Bill Gates claims to be making a stable operating
system and Linus Torvalds claims to be trying to take over the
world. -- seen on the net
Manoj Srivastava
2003-02-13 16:28:09 UTC
Permalink
Hi

This is the new version, with the input of people on the
list.

1
Jochen Voss <***@web.de>, Andrew Suffield <***@debian.org>:
Re worded section 3 to "when the outcome is no longer in doubt"

2
Jochen Voss <***@web.de>"
A.3: Added quotes around Further discussion.
I think the construct "...If none of the sponsors of any of the
proposals object" is correct, no matter how non-intuitive it looks
to non English speakers.

3
Andrew Suffield <***@debian.org>:
Added A.2(4) with similar rewording as A.2(2)

4
Andrew Suffield <***@debian.org>:
Reworded A.3(1)

5
Jochen Voss <***@web.de>, Andrew Suffield <***@debian.org>,
Steve Greenland <***@moregruel.net>
Stylistic consistency when referring to options A, B, etc. Also
changed the letter denoting Quorum requirements from Q to R, since
Q has been already defined previously in another context.

manoj
Jochen Voss
2003-02-13 17:44:30 UTC
Permalink
Hi Manoj,
is the new version, with the input of people on the list.
I'm happy with this, now. Thank you for your work,

Jochen
--
Omm
(0)-(0)
http://www.mathematik.uni-kl.de/~wwwstoch/voss/index.html
Markus Schulze
2003-02-15 10:27:34 UTC
Permalink
Dear Clinton,
Post by Clinton Mead
Participation Monotonicity.
If
(i) There is an election X in which option A wins.
(ii) There is a vote V ranks option A over option B.
(iii) There is an election Y identical to election X except that it has
an additional vote V.
then
Option B must not win election Y.
What Participation Monotonicity says is, that participation will never
cause a less prefered option to win than non-participation. That is, it
is never advantagous to not participate.
The participation criterion and the Condorcet criterion are incompatible.
(Proof: Herve Moulin, "Condorcet's Principle Implies the No Show Paradox,"
Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 45, pp. 53-64, 1988.)

As far as I know, only point methods (e.g. plurality, Approval Voting,
Borda) meet the participation criterion.

Markus Schulze
Continue reading on narkive:
Loading...